Furthermore, the bigger the State grows, the more its real force increases, though not in direct proportion to its growth; but, the State remaining the same, the number of magistrates may increase to any extent, without the government gaining any greater real force; for its force is that of the State, the dimension of which remains equal.
There is between these two bodies this essential difference, that the State exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign. I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force.
Thus, the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will second, and the individual will strongest of all: If finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the will casino news new york the Sovereign, and should employ the public force in his hands in obedience to this particular will, there would be, so to speak, two Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would evaporate instantly, and the body politic would be dissolved.
Without their concurrence, nothing is, or should be, done. In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that of the whole to the whole, or of the Sovereign to the State.
Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is.
This form of government is called democracy. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the subject undergoes no change, and each equally is under the whole authority of the laws, while his vote, being reduced to a hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in drawing them up. In a perfect act of legislation, the individual or particular will should be at zero; the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very subordinate position; and, consequently, the general or sovereign will should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest.
In the former sense, the relation, considered according to quantity, is expressed by the quotient; in the latter, considered according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity. What then is government?
This rule is immediately deducible from the principle laid down. An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political. If, in the different States, the number of supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to the number of citizens, it follows that, generally, democratic government suits small States, aristocratic government those of middle size, and monarchy great ones.
But it is impossible to count the innumerable circumstances which may furnish exceptions.
It follows further that, one of the extreme terms, viz. I am speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the State. Thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there is in the ordinary sense of the word. There has been at all times much dispute concerning the best form of government, without consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the best, and in others the worst.
According to the natural order, on the other hand, these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved into other similar relations. In the first place, the Sovereign may commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the majority of the people, so that more citizens are magistrates than are mere private individuals.
We said that the relation of the Sovereign to the subjects was greater in proportion as the people was more numerous, and, by a clear analogy, we may say the same of the relation of the government to the magistrates. This granted, if the whole government is in the hands of one man, the particular and the corporate will are wholly united, and consequently the latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity.
The difficulties lie in the manner of so ordering this subordinate whole within the whole, that it in no way alters the general constitution by affirmation of its own, and always distinguishes the particular force it possesses, which is destined to aid in its preservation, from the public force, which is destined to the preservation of the State; and, in a word, is always ready to sacrifice the government to the people, and never to sacrifice the people to the government.
It should be remarked that all these forms, or at least the first two, admit of degree, and even of very wide differences; for democracy may include the whole people, or may be restricted to half. This third form is the most usual, and is called monarchy, or royal government.
But the total force of the government, being always that of the State, is invariable; so that, the more of this force it expends on its own members, the less it has left to employ on the whole people.
If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy.
From this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of government, but as many governments differing in nature as there are States differing in size. Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i. But, as countless events may change the relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but also for the same people at different times.
It follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.
However, in order that the government may have a true existence and a real life distinguishing it from the body of the State, and in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfil the end for which it was set up, it must have a particular personality, a sensibility common to its members, and a force and will of its own making for its preservation.
The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous. Sparta always had two kings, as its constitution provided; and the Roman Empire saw as many as eight emperors at once, without it being possible to say that the Empire was split up. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries.
We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, casino huancayo can belong to it alone.
The more numerous the magistrates, therefore, the weaker the government. The body of the magistrate may be composed of a greater or a less number of members. There are even more: If a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to, they will both stay where they are.
Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them. If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government, it is only necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured by the number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, to save words, I borrow for a moment the terms of geometry, I am none the less well aware that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy.
We can see, for instance, that each magistrate is more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to which he belongs, and that consequently the particular will has much more influence on the acts of the government than on those of the Sovereign; for each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function, while each citizen, taken singly, exercises no function of Sovereignty.
This principle being fundamental, we must do our best to make it clear. Finally, without departing directly from the end for which it was instituted, it may deviate more or less from it, according to the manner of its constitution.
Thus, the government, having always the same absolute force, will be at the lowest point of its relative force or activity.